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This paper presents a comparison of two psychoanalytic models of how human beings
learn to use their mental capacities to know meaningfully about the world. The first,
Fonagy’s model of mentalization, is concerned with the development of a self capable
of reflecting upon its own and others’ mental states, based on feelings, thoughts, intentions,
and desires. The other, Bion‘s model of thinking, is about the way thoughts are dealt with
by babies, facilitating the construction of a thinking apparatus within a framework of
primitive ways of communication between mother and baby. The theories are compared
along three axes: (a) an axis of the theoretical and philosophical backgrounds of the
models; (b) an axis of the kind of evidence that supports them; and (c) the third axis of
the technical implications of the ideas of each model. It is concluded that, although the
models belong to different theoretical and epistemological traditions and are supported
by different sorts of evidence, they may be located along the same developmental line
using an intersubjective framework that maintains tension between the intersubjective
and the intrapsychic domains of the mind. 
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Este artículo muestra la comparación entre dos modelos psicoanalíticos que dan cuenta
de cómo los seres humanos alcanzan la posibilidad de usar sus capacidades mentales
para conocer y comprender el mundo de un modo significativo. De un lado, el modelo
de la mentalización de Fonagy se preocupa por el desarrollo de un sí mismo (self) capaz
de reflexionar sobre los estados mentales propios y los de los demás, en términos de
pensamientos, sentimientos y deseos. De otro lado, el modelo del pensamiento de Bion,
se refiere al modo por el cual el bebé lidia con los pensamientos, y posibilita la construcción
de un aparato para pensarlos y acceder a un entendimiento emocional de los mismos,
dentro de un marco de comunicación primaria con la madre. Ambos modelos son
comparados a través de tres ejes: (a) los antecedentes filosóficos y teóricos, (b) el tipo
de evidencia, y (c) las implicaciones para la técnica psicoanalítica. Aunque ambos modelos
pertenecen a diferentes tradiciones teóricas y epistemológicas, se concluye que las
capacidades para pensar y mentalizar podrían ser ubicadas al interior de una misma
línea de desarrollo. Para ello, es necesario utilizar un marco de referencia intersubjetivista,
que sostenga la tensión entre los dominios intersubjetivos e intrapsíquicos de la mente.
Palabras clave: teoría de la mente, intersubjetividad, psicoanálisis, pensamiento,
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The Capacity to Mentalize
In two pivotal papers called “Playing with Reality,” Fonagy
and Target (1996a, 1996b) offered a detailed description of the
line of development about the acquisition of a capacity by which
a child can reflect upon his own and on others’ mental states
in terms of intentions, beliefs, and desires, and can access a
world ruled by psychologically meaningful interactions. This
reflective self enables the individual to enter the representational
world: We are subjects of our reflection and, at the same time,
the ones who carry out the reflective and observational activity.
This reflective self, capable of constructing representations about
its own and other’s actions, is distinguished from a pre-reflective
self, which is the “[…] immediate—that is, unmediated—
experiencer of life [...]” (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgit,
1991, p. 201), incapable of taking an observing and knowing
stance with respect to itself. The reflective, or mentalizing, self
develops from the exchanges with another mind in an inter-
subjective framework. In this process, the infant “[...] finds an
image of himself in his mother’s mind, as an individual with
thoughts and feelings” (Fonagy, & Target, 1996a, p. 229).
According to Fonagy and Target (1996b), the capacity
to mentalize develops mainly from the integration of two
modes of experiencing psychic reality, between the second
and fifth year of life. The authors call these modes the
psychic equivalence and the pretend mode. 
In the psychic equivalence mode, the child experiences
ideas as replicas of external reality. Ideas are not recognized
as such, as there are no proper representations of oneself
and others. The internal world is expected to function under
the rules of physical causality and to correspond to external
reality (Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy & Target, 1996a).
This way of experiencing psychic reality alternates with
the pretend mode. In this mode, when the child plays, he
knows that ideas are just ideas because the context
deliberately allows this, but he fails to relate this internal
state to external reality. Internal reality is enriched with all
this pretence and fantasy, which brings about a capacity to
treat ideas as mental entities, but it does not occur in
connection with external reality. In the pretend mode, ideas
cannot threaten because of their disconnection with reality,
it is impossible to grasp internal and external reality at the
same time. The child oscillates between both modes, and it
is through the process of their integration that the capacity
to mentalize is achieved (Fonagy & Target, 1996a, 1996b).
The authors note that this happens between the fourth and
fifth year of life and is achieved with the help of parents,
siblings, and peers whose minds are used by the child as
containers of his own intentions, feelings, and beliefs, mainly
in the context of play. The continual incorporation and
presence of mental states into the dialogue and exchanges
between the child and his playmates will provide the child
with a framework so he can see his fantasies and ideas
represented in the other’s mind. In time, the child will introject
not only the image of his mental processes in the other’s
mind, but also the representation of the process of making
meaningful representations, that is, the capacity to mentalize. 
Mentalization, according to Fonagy and Target (1996b),
offers the child a number of advantages: the opportunity to
find meaning in people’s actions, a clear demarcation between
inner and external reality, the capacity to manipulate mental
representations defensively, a good level of intersubjective
contact with others, and so on. Mentalization places the child
more in touch with his own and other’s feelings, beliefs, and
desires; this reinforces attunement with other people.
Insofar as this capacity develops in an interpersonal
framework, the presence of a unresponsive caregiver, incapable
of thinking about her child in terms of mental states, would
contribute drastically to a poor integration of the two modes
of experiencing psychic reality that normally leads to
mentalization. It has been shown that secure attachment
facilitates the acquisition of the reflective function. The child
feels safe, and a sensitive mother, who is capable of imagining
her child’s feelings, meets his needs. Therefore, the parent’s
capacity to mentalize will predict the child’s attachment security
and his own mentalizing development (Fonagy & Target, 1997).
When a child has been mistreated and traumatized, in
order to get rid of facing his parent’s thoughts of him as
malevolent and their intention of harming him, the child
defends himself by inhibiting the development of mentalizing
capacities. The child stops thinking about others in terms
of intentions, beliefs, and desires, as they involve the danger
of becoming real. Also, when physical violence is the means
of communication between child and adult, the body will
become the scenario for dealing with ideas, feelings, and
thoughts. The child’s incapacity to keep ideas in mind or to
give meaning to actions will make him prone to action,
increasing impulsiveness and violence toward his own body
and other selves. The failure to find another’s mind in which
the child may see his own represented will lead to continuous
attempts to find alternative ways of containment with
increasing use of projection, less separation, and more
dependence (Fonagy & Target, 1995, 1997, 1998). 
In brief, the capacity to reflect upon one’s own self and
on other selves in terms of beliefs, feelings, and desires is
achieved through safe, meaningful, and emotional exchanges
between child and mother, fostered by the relationships with
siblings, peers, and mainly the father, and facilitated in the
scenario of play.
The Theory of Thinking
The theory of thinking, published by Bion in 1962, is a
theoretical contribution of great importance and many
repercussions in psychoanalytic theory and practice. For
Bion, thinking is a capacity that develops in order to deal
with thoughts (Bion, 1967a).
Thoughts pre-exist in a primitive way, and their
development causes the emergence of an thinking apparatus
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(Bleandonu, 1994). Thinking is achieved when the baby
meets two requirements: the development of thoughts and
an apparatus to cope with them (Bion, 1967a). But what is
thinking, in Bion’s terms? It is impossible to attribute complex
forms of thinking, as we know them, to a very small baby.
O’Shaughnessy (1988) notes that Bion refers to an early
form of thinking, which is the predecessor and basis of later
forms. Thinking in this context is the process by which the
baby gets to know psychic qualities; it is an emotional
experience driven by the need to know and understand his
own psychic reality and that of other selves. The purpose of
this experience is to make sense of incomprehensible feelings
that the baby experiences in early life and that are different
from physical stimuli, which are processed through physical
channels: the body. Likewise, the baby needs a channel to
process mental contents, just as the stomach digests food.
The model proposed by Bion holds that, early on in life,
there is a psychosomatic channel between mother and baby.
This channel performs, for instance, the task of processing
both the milk the child receives from its mother and the love
that accompanies it. 
According to Bion (1967a), thought develops at different
levels. The most primitive thought is a pre-conception, that
is, an inborn expectation that something matches something
else, like mouth and nipple. When an expectation is met, a
conception appears. Therefore, a conception comes with a
relative state of satisfaction. Bion reserves the term thought
to refer to the encounter of a pre-conception with an absence.
Here, the baby is faced with a state of frustration, the
frustration of a breast being absent. In the baby’s mind, the
absence of the breast is felt as the presence of a bad object,
but if the baby is able to tolerate this state of frustration and
need, he will recognize the absence of the object, and this
“non-thing” will become a thought. With the repetition of
these processes, new conceptions and thoughts are developed
and, with them, an apparatus for thinking appears. These
processes characterize what Bion refers to as the non-
psychotic apart of personality, concerned with a linking
activity. It should be noted also that, for Bion, frustration
tolerance is an innate factor (Grinberg, Sor, & Tabak de
Bianchedi, 1993).
If the baby is unable to tolerate frustration, his aim will
be to get rid of it by evasion. Instead of a thought, a bad
object remains in the baby´s mind and he will try to expel
it by an excessive use of projective identification. In normal
circumstances, this mechanism is used by the baby to
communicate his troubled feelings to the mother. By making
the mother feel what he cannot tolerate in his mind, the
mother, if well adjusted, will respond to her child by turning
these intolerable feelings into more tolerable ones. If the
mother is not capable of tolerating her child’s projections,
the infant will continue to communicate them to his mother
with increased force. This will make the baby feel that his
projections are stripped of their meaning, leading to the
introjection of what Bion (1967a) called a “nameless dread”
(Bleandonu, 1994). The relation between the failure to build
a mental apparatus and the psychotic part of personality will
be explained in depth in the following pages.
Up to this point, I have mainly described the vicissitudes
of thoughts and the different apparatus that result from dealing
with them. I will offer a brief account of the concept of the
alpha function and, then, I will link this concept to the model
of container-contained that Bion (1962) created to better
understand the development of the thinking apparatus.
For Bion (1962), the existence of an alpha function that
transforms sensory impressions into material for dream thoughts
must be assumed. With this function, it becomes possible to
conceive of being awake and going to sleep, being conscious
or unconscious. These sensory impressions related to emotional
experience and turned into material for dream thoughts are
called alpha elements (visual, auditory, or olfactory images).
They will merge and form a screen called the contact barrier
(Grinberg et al., 1993), which separates the unconscious from
the conscious, the internal world from the external world.
When the alpha function is not operating, sensory impressions
remain undigested and become beta elements. These elements
remain agglomerated and cannot be used for dream thoughts.
Therefore, the failure of the alpha function to produce alpha
elements will lead to a psychotic state in which the person is
unable to dream, and the demarcation between the conscious
and the unconscious is unclear. In normal conditions, the alpha
function develops when communication and internalization
processes, via projective identification between mother and
baby, are adequate (Bion, 1967a). If the mother is there to
help her baby to tolerate frustration and to make sense of his
incomprehensible feelings, his sensory and emotional
impressions are turned into alpha elements. Therefore, the
alpha function, performed by the mother in a state Bion (1962)
called “reverie,” is, over time, introjected by the child and
used as part of his capacity to make sense of things. Thereby,
the acquisition of a thinking apparatus develops within a
dynamic and intersubjective relationship between the mother,
as an object capable of containing, and a baby who projects
feelings that have to be contained. 
The mechanism represented by the relationship between
the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions (Ps↔D)
functions with the container-contained model. By Ps↔D,
Bion (1962) means a movement from disintegration to
integration states that brings about a selected fact. The
selected fact is something that organizes chaos, introducing
coherence into what is dispersed and disorganized. Again,
we observe the idea of something unorganized and confused
that becomes understandable and tolerable, something that
is “digested” and invested with sense. 
To summarize: The thinking apparatus develops in an
intersubjective framework where the mother contains and
transforms what her baby cannot into organized and coherent
contents that are pleasant for the baby and crucial for the
acquisition of his future capacity to produce and to deal
with thoughts.
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Theoretical Background and Philosophical Influences
The two models belong to different theoretical traditions:
There is nothing new in that. Fonagy’s model belongs to a
contemporary Freudian perspective in which Anna Freud’s
concept of developmental line is crucial. Mental processes
are understood as products of development and not as
elements which are given. Behind this is probably the
Freudian idea of an Ego that develops from an Id in response
to adaptation to reality. Totally different are most Kleinian
ideas about the ego, which, according to Klein, is present
from birth in a primitive way. Bion comes from a Kleinian
tradition, but he was interested in constructing a meta-
psychology complementary to Klein’s meta-psychology. He
was known as a “meta-theoretician.”
Bion, like Fonagy, sees the capacity to think as a process
that needs to develop within an inter-subjective relationship.
Fonagy is rigorous in describing like a developmental
psychologist the developmental sequence of the capacity to
mentalize. He also places his theory in an intersubjective
framework. However, in Fonagy’s model, there are figures
other than the mother that are clearly taken into account. There
are constant references to the familiar environment, the role of
the father, siblings, and peers. Bion is mainly concerned with
the mother- (or primary caregiver) and-baby dyad, probably
because the development of the thinking apparatus occurs very
early, whereas the reflective self described by Fonagy develops
mainly between the second and fifth year of life. 
Another point of comparison is the weight each author
gives to innate and environmental factors. Even though Fonagy
mentions cases in which an impaired capacity to mentalize
is due to constitutional conditions such as chronic illness or
disability, he mainly attributes the failure to develop the
reflective function to the lack of a caregiver who is able to
reflect upon the child’s mental states in terms of beliefs,
desires, and feelings (Fonagy & Target, 1998). There is
causality in the idea of a trans-generational transmission of
the reflection function, the importance of the actual parental
figures is pivotal. For Bion (1967a, b), the innate proportion
of the death instinct and its manifestation in envy and lack
of frustration tolerance is crucial. These elements will influence
and obscure normal development, making the child attack
everything that links him to the awareness of reality. This
will impair his capacity to develop thoughts and a thinking
apparatus, even if there is a seemingly adequate mother. 
Both models are concerned with a function (alpha and
reflective function) that develops not within the baby’s self,
but from the meaningful interactions between the baby and
another self, or selves, in the case of the reflective function.
The incorporation of this object (the function) by either
introjection or internalization is for both models the decisive
goal that is achieved from this inter-subjective relationship.
The capacity to think and to mentalize can be seen as
part of the same line of development, and the alpha function
seems to be the seed for the reflective function. Therefore,
Fonagy’s model could be seen as complementary to and
extensive of Bion’s model and others’1 (Fonagy & Target,
1996b). For the authors of the series “Playing with reality,”
the path followed by a “Bionian” baby in the formation of
early concepts will resemble the process of experiencing
psychic reality in their model. 
Bion’s interest in meta-psychology is revealed in his
ideas about the foundations of psychoanalysis (Lansky,
1981), his theory of functions, and the notations shown in
the grid (Bion, 1988 ) are an example of that. Wisdom
(1981) explains Bion’s aim of having a strong meta-
psychology to understand thinking. Fonagy shares a meta-
psychological interest insofar as the capacity to mentalize
is a meta-psychological process: The child has to learn to
think about thinking (Fonagy & Target 1996b).
There is another similarity in the dialectic nature of the
models. Although Fonagy’s model is explained in terms of a
line of development, this does not imply total linearity. For
example, there are fluctuations and movements between both
ways of experiencing psychic reality in the pre-reflective self:
psychic equivalence and pretend modes. Also, the inter-
subjective framework in which the synthesis of these modes
brings about mentalization corresponds to a dialectical model:
the internalization of a reflective function (Fonagy & Target,
1996a). In Bion’s model, the dialectic quality of the Ps↔D is
more obvious and well known (Steiner, 1992), as Klein herself
described both positions as being in constant movement and
fluctuation within the personality. Bion’s model also resembles
Hegel’s idea of synthesis as an integrative product from the
dialectical dynamic between a thesis and an antithesis. However,
Klein sees a movement from the depressive to the paranoid
schizoid position as a defense against depressive anxiety. For
Bion, in normal projective identification, there should be a
healthy movement between the positions. For example, in
creative thinking, previous ideas must be dismantled before
creating new ones. For this purpose, the previous container has
to be dissolved and then restored with the new theories and
ideas. In this dissolution, a state of fragmentation is reached
and with this, a movement to the paranoid schizoid position is
made. When the new ideas are implemented and the container
is reformed, the depressive position re-emerges (Hinshelwood,
1991). In other words, a psychic change implies flexibility
between the positions. Coming back to Hegel, it can be
observed that, in the case of Fonagy’s theory, a synthesis of
the movements between the psychic equivalent and the pretend
modes of experiencing psychic reality is represented by the
reflective self. However, the dialectical nature (related to the
positions in one case and the ways of experiencing psychic
reality in the other) seems to be stronger in Bion’s model than
in Fonagy’s, where, once the capacity to mentalize is reached,
a regression to a previous way of experiencing psychic reality
could be seen as symptomatic or defensive.
When examining a theory, it is interesting to study the
philosophical influences that have been used as an
epistemological basis. The philosophical ideas used as
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epistemological basis in Fonagy’s theory belong to the
tradition of the philosophy of mind. The author always relies
on Davidsonian ideas about a mind created in relation to
other minds (Fonagy & Moran, 1991)                 
The work of Marcia Cavell (1993), who bridged
psychoanalysis and philosophy of mind, supporting the idea
that psychoanalysis could be seen as an extension of
commonsense psychology, is essential here. Psychoanalysis,
concerned with irrationality, fills the gaps that commonsense
psychology left by considering rational processes as the only
ones that can be understood in terms of beliefs and desires.
The idea of a psychoanalytic encounter in which
interpretation is possible because beliefs and desires are
shared by people is crucial in Cavell’s thought (Snelling,
2001). These ideas lend psychoanalysis an epistemological
basis and this is exactly what Fonagy uses to sustain his
findings. Cavell says that a child becomes a “subject” when
he becomes able to communicate with others, when he can
interpret others’ behavior in terms of mental states, and
become comprehensible to others in the same terms (Cavell).
According to Lansky (1981), Bion is a Kantian looking at
Kleinian concepts. The influence of Kant is revealed in his
constant interest in epistemology. The Kantian idea that things
in the material world and in the mental apparatus share the
nature of being unknowable is crucial for Bion’s thinking.
These things become knowable only when individuals
apprehend from them the qualities that can be perceived by
their senses and organized by their categories, creating a
synthesis. Therefore, it is impossible to “know” a thing or a
human being entirely because the only way truly to know either
is by being that specific thing or that specific human being. In
Bion’s terms, there is a basic unknowability of anything that
performs the alpha function. However, everything that undergoes
thinking is transformed and knowable (alpha elements). On
the other hand, beta elements, as things-in-themselves, remain
unmetabolized and impossible to use because they have not
been transformed into something knowable. Only when they
are expelled via projective identification or transformed into
hallucinations can they become shared as emotional or sensory
experience, for example, by the analyst in session (Lansky). 
With regard to the philosophical backgrounds, there seem
to be striking differences between the models. For one thing,
the mind is shared and public. Human beings are interpretable
by other human beings insofar as they share the same mental
states: They all desire and believe, and beliefs and desires are
behind actions. In Bion´s model, it seems impossible to really
“know” something, even though there is a strong impulse to
get to know someone else, called the K-link. There are still
remains of an internalistic way of understanding mental
processes, although the mechanism of projective identification,
as the mother and baby’s channel to communicate primitive
contents, would be considered a step beyond a private
conceptualization of the mind. It seems that Bion´s model is
midway between a pure internalistic model of the mind and
a contemporary intersubjective and relational one.
However, in order to reach scientific status, a theoretical
model should rely not only on a sound epistemological basis,
but should be based on strong evidence. 
Evidence
For the sake of clarity, when presenting the evidence
found for each model, I will divide it into two groups:
clinical and empirical. The clinical evidence is concerned
with psychopathological manifestations that lead to or
illustrate theoretical propositions in both models, whereas
empirical evidence refers to research and experiments that
support the findings of each theory. 
Bion’s model of thinking derives mainly from his work
with schizophrenics (Grinberg et al., 1993). In one of his early
works, he described how there are psychotic and nonpsychotic
parts in everyone’s personality. These parts become separated
with one of them predominating over the other; finally they
become unbridgeable (Bion, 1967). The aim of the psychotic
part of the personality is to attack everything that enables the
individual to be aware of reality. Thus, the individual will
direct his attacks against anything that performs the function
of linking. The part of psychic apparatus that performs this
task is, precisely, consciousness; therefore, the psychotic patient
will direct his attacks against his own apparatus for perceiving
reality. Insofar as thinking enables the individual to get to
know psychic and external reality, the psychotic person will
attack his own capacity to develop a thinking apparatus (Bion,
1967a,b). Lacking an apparatus to deal with or “digest” sensory
impressions and thoughts, the individual will develop an
apparatus to get rid of unmetabolized elements. Instead of
developing alpha elements, the individual will accumulate
undigested facts, or beta elements. This apparatus will attempt
to eject these beta elements by excessive use of projective
identification. Once expelled, these elements will engulf objects
of the reality that will acquire the characteristics of the part
of the ego expelled (with superego parts), forming what Bion
called bizarre objects (Bion, 1967a). For this individual, such
objects will try to return in a retaliatory and persecutory way
and will pervade his existence. As these bizarre objects contain
the part of the ego related to the awareness of sensory
impressions, the object will be felt as looking at, talking to,
touching, etc., the individual. The sense organs will therefore
be used not for recollecting impressions of psychic and external
reality, but for expelling undesirable indigestible elements.
Psychotic individuals, in their failure to develop the alpha
function, will never differentiate unconsciousness from
consciousness and will never sleep properly or fantasize. 
Summarizing, the psychotic part of the personality is
pictured as “[...] a tendency to aim at the destruction of all
functions of unification, linking or joining of two objects”
(Bleandonu, 1994, p. 136). In contrast, the nonpsychotic part
of personality is concerned with linking, with matching two
things for the emergence of a third. In this part resides the
potential to build an apparatus to deal with thoughts and to
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make sense of feelings. As this thinking apparatus develops
with the internalization of the mother’s alpha capacity, the
child should have the disposition to receive her products and
tolerate her delays. Bion (1967a) noted that, for this to happen,
there should be appropriate frustration tolerance, and a low
amount of envy and death instinct, which imply the primacy
of life instincts. In psychotics, all these factors occur the
opposite way: the amounts of envy are enormous and the
conflict instinct is never resolved. This inner hate prevents
the baby from accepting what the mother gives, feeling envy
of her capacities, and destroying the possibility of real contact
with her. This envy and hate will increase with the difficulty
to tolerate frustration. Bion noted this as fundamental in the
incapacity to develop thoughts and a thinking apparatus. There
are other cases in which an appropriate mother is lacking.
Here, the baby is left alone in his attempts to process his
unbearable feelings without containment. The only things the
baby introjects are his own projections stripped of meaning:
a nameless dread (Bion, 1962, 1967a). Mainly, matching a
baby with an inborn predisposition to an adverse environment
will foster psychotic functioning (O’Shaughnessy, 1992).
Bion’s interest in understanding madness was remarkable,
as was Freud’s. Bion’s findings from his work with
psychotics enabled him to create a model for the acquisition
of a thinking apparatus and development of thoughts, which
may be absent or perverted in these individuals. 
Many post-Kleinian authors give accounts of the
phenomena described by Bion in their own clinical practice,
reporting continual evidence for this model (Britton, 1992;
Malcolm, 1992; Meltzer, 1986; O’Shaughnessy, 1988, 1992).
For example, in Meltzer’s clinical application of the concept
of the “reversal of alpha function” to understand the material
brought by a patient in a dream, he stressed the fact that
Bion’s conceptualizations of the attacks on linking and the
dynamics of the beta elements that were expelled and became
bizarre objects were enormously explanatory in comparison
with the Kleinian theory before Bion. As another example,
O’Shaughnessy (1988) reflected upon the importance of
Bion’s theory of thinking in psychoanalysis of children.
Regarding some patients’ attacks on the possibility of learning
from analysis and finding meanings there, the study of
Malcolm attempts to better understand the vicissitudes of
this kind of patient within the setting, using these ideas.
Britton exemplified failures in the container-contained model
for the development of thinking with some clinical material. 
In the case of Fonagy’s model, clinical evidence is
extensive. I have divided it into three groups: psychoanalysis
of children, borderline patients, and violent individuals.
In working psychoanalytically with children, Fonagy and
Target (1998) noted the need to change some aspects of the
classical model, mainly, regarding the requirements children
usually have to meet in order to become “psycho-analyzable.”
A special group, whose pathology compromised mainly their
control of impulses, affecting regulation and self-monitoring,
seemed to receive no benefit from the classical interpretative
approach. These patients chiefly presented what could be called
developmental pathology, showing a failure to mentalize. These
“developmental arrests” are better understood when the reasons
why the “arrest” occurred are examined. In most cases, these
disorders were rooted in an inhibition of the mentalization
capacity, as a defensive response toward an environment
perceived as unsafe. This environment was almost always one
in which the child was constantly exposed to trauma. Insofar
as the reflective self develops by finding one’s mind represented
in the caregiver’s, these children, instead of facing the sad
reality of finding in their mother’s mind a malevolent
representation of themselves or harmful intentions toward
them, chose instead to suspend the faculty of thinking about
it, and along with it, the capacity to conceive of others and
of themselves in a world of intentions, beliefs, and desires. 
In these children, the problem is at the level of
developing robust mental processes (Fonagy, Moran,
Edgcumbe, Kennedy, & Target, 1993). Here, the problem
is not that there is an intolerable representation in the child’s
mind; what is intolerable is to have a mind that is able to
produce representations. That is the reason for the inhibition
of mentalization, as a defensive maneuver. 
The incapacity to mentalize is also found In the case of
adult borderline patients (Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy & Target,
1995). Once again, an inadequate caregiver, unable to reflect
upon her child’s mental states but prone to react defensively
or violently, will create in her mind a distorted representation
of her child. The child, then, will internalize this distorted
image of himself, feeling it as an alien part. Therefore, the
borderline patient will desperately try to get rid of this alien
part by placing it outside, in another person, whom he can
hate, humiliate, or frighten. The need for the other’s physical
presence is, therefore, crucial for his psychological survival.
It is the only way to make sure that this alien part will not
return to him destructively. Dependence is understood within
this framework (Fonagy & Target, 1998), and suicide
attempts are seen as the need to kill the alien part and
liberate the self from it (Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 1999). 
The instability shown by these patients also reveals their
poor capacity to reflect and their lack of complex and flexible
mental representations. Therefore, they only have one way
to see reality and this makes them prone to anxiety and
intolerance. The constantly used splitting mechanisms express
their failure to achieve complete mental representations of
themselves and of other selves. The feelings of emptiness
that borderlines frequently complain of are related to their
internalization of an empty representation of their own mind
from the caregiver (Fonagy et al., 1999). 
Most of the attacks borderline patients direct toward
analysis and the analyst reveal an attack on the analyst’s
mental capacities and on the space designated to face
mentalization, the setting. Their lack of empathy is related to
the absence of a “theory of pain,” through which one can
imagine what the other is feeling. The diffusion of identity
is related to their incapacity to have representations of mental
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states and self-images. This contributes to a lack of a sense
of continuity in time that is crucial for a strong identity and
object constancy, mourning processes, and individuation. Their
difficulty in following associations and their confusion of
language are also related to their incapacity to keep in mind
the other’s point of view and mental states (Fonagy, 1991). 
Failures in mentalizing are frequently found in violent
patients. Here, violent patients are not the ones belonging to
the cycle of abuse, but the ones that show senseless aggression.
Why would these individuals be violent if they had not been
treated violently? Fonagy and Target (1995) explain that they
have suffered a more subtle violence, one directed at the
psychological self. There is no physical abuse but instead a
mother in whose mind there was a no representation of her
child as an intentional human being. Instead of that, there was
a vacuum. This led to the internalization of a representation
of the child which was felt as an alien part. The individual’s
harmful and violent acts reveal attempts to kill this alien part,
or get rid of other painful thoughts. In a state of lacking a
mind to represent ideas, the body is used as the vehicle to
deal with thoughts and feelings: “The patient’s unconscious
fantasy may be that ideas reside in the body” (Fonagy &
Target, 1995, p. 495). In cases in which the mother is unable
to reflect upon her child, there should be a father who,
perceiving his child and the relation between mother and child,
lets the baby know that he, the baby, is in interaction with
another self and takes part in an intersubjective relationship. 
In both models, there is emphasis on clinical findings.
The idea of inhibiting or attacking the entities that make it
possible to think and have mental representations is quite
similar, and as is the way this is observed in clinical settings
in terms of attacks directed at the analyst and at analysis.
The nameless dread and the internalization of a vacuum
seem to be similar concepts. Both authors are concerned
with understanding severe psychopathologies.
In terms of experimental, or empirical, evidence, I have
only found data about Fonagy’s model. This is probably due
to this author’s special interest in reaching a scientific stance
inside and outside the psychoanalytic community. For that
reason, even the language employed in this model is more
akin to the one used in developmental or cognitive psychology.
However, the difference may be that, in this model, a meta-
cognitive capacity such as mentalization is achieved in
interaction with other figures, and the role of emotions and
affects is always noted. There are numerous investigations
from the psychological field that justify the model of
mentalization; however, they will not be discussed here. These
investigations are mainly related to evidence that supports
the different ways of experiencing psychic reality mentioned
above, and the importance of the involvement of all the family
members in the integration of a reflective function (Fonagy
& Target, 1996b). The above-mentioned relationship between
mentalization and attachment security is very interesting in
terms of evidence. One of the most important conclusions of
the London Parent-Child Project was that parents who are
capable of conceiving relationships and interactions in terms
of mental processes will be more sensitive to recognize their
children’s needs; this will make their children feel safe and
become securely attached. In a safe relationship, the possibility
to think about one’s own and others’ mental states is
guaranteed. Therefore, these children will be able to mentalize
and, as adults, they will become sensitive towards their own
children’s needs. The benign cycle is reproduced and a trans-
generational transmission of the reflective function addressed
(Fonagy et al., 1991).
In this discussion of empirical evidence, it is worth
remembering that Bion, enormously interested in granting
a scientific status to psychoanalysis, as Fonagy also seems
to be, focused more on meta-psychology than on empirical
research. However, Bion, in the first paragraph of his “A
theory of thinking,” said: “It is devised with the intention
that practicing psychoanalysis should restate the hypothesis
of which it is composed in terms of empirically verifiable
data” (Bion, 1967a, p. 110).
The numerous illustrations of Fonagy’s model about the
defensive nature of the inhibition of mentalization in
borderline patients, for example, could be seen as empirical
support of Bion’s ideas on the attacks some people carry
out against the awareness of reality and the tendency to
avoid the frustration that it entails. Likewise, we could say
that Bion’s ideas about attacks on linking are theoretical
support for Fonagy’s ideas about how the patient, when in
analysis, keeps attacking the analyst’s mind and the setting,
as a space where mental capacities should emerge. In one
way or another, both models could be used to support each
other. There is a kind of mutual external validity.
Looking at the etiology of the incapacity to think and
the arrested capacity of mentalization, it could be said that
there is a defensive purpose behind both of them. The
avoidance of frustration by the baby in a state of psychic
pain and need leads him to attack and obscure his own
apparatus for gaining awareness of psychic and external
reality. Inhibiting a mental capacity so as to be unaware of
the parent’s mental representations about the baby is, as in
the other case, a defensive maneuver. Both models seem to
agree about the defensive nature of the impossibility of
achieving mentalization and thinking processes, and the need
to avoid psychic pain. However, the difference would be
found in the weight given by each model to innate and
environmental triggers. As observed, in Bion’s model, there
is a strong innate component for not developing an adequate
thinking apparatus and thoughts: frustration intolerance, a
high amount of death instinct manifested in envy. Also, there
must be a mother who is incapable of performing reverie.
In contrast, in Fonagy’s model, emphasis is almost entirely
on the caregiver, as this author constantly reminds readers
of the interpersonal nature of his model.
I have mainly described the clinical evidence I have found
in each model, but clinical formulations of psychopathology
convey technical issues. This is our next subject.
Consequences of the Theory of Technique
The container-contained model is a useful framework to
understand psychoanalytic technique (Spillius, 1992). In the
setting, patient and analyst somehow repeat the very early
relationship between baby and mother. The patient projects
his mental contents onto the analyst all the time, and she
contains and processes them with her reverie. Moreover, the
psychoanalytic setting, as a space in itself, is seen as a container
of what happens within it. The experience of containment, as
an inherent part of the setting, is considered therapeutic in
itself. Fonagy’s model, in a similar way but in different terms,
considers the analytic relationship, mainly when working with
children, as one that, of its own accord, provides an aid to the
child: a developmental aid. For example, when playing with
a child in the setting, the analyst, as a benign person, offers
his mind to be explored freely by the child. In this process,
the child is repeating a part of his development, but in a safe
setting, benefiting from the experience of the relationship itself.
By enabling him to experience the analyst’s mental activity,
the child is thus helped to understand his own psychic reality
(Fonagy, 1989; Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
Interpretation has always been the main technical tool
in psychoanalysis. However, with patients whose capacities
to mentalize are inhibited, the classical interpretative
approach is not useful. Instead, the reflective function can
be promoted if, within the setting, the patient is step-by-
step invited to think, not about his unconscious motivations
and past experiences, but about what he believes is going
on in the analyst’s mind. This technical tool is justified by
the fact that human beings become intentional beings by
finding a representation of their own selves as intentional
individuals in someone else’s mind. Therefore, transference
interpretations centered on the analyst are more useful to
help people with these problems. Steiner (1993) refers to
patients who do not want to understand but want to be
understood. In such cases, analyst-centered interpretations
and clarifications are useful. These ideas from the Kleinian
school seem to match Fonagy’s. Only when the patient’s
exploration of the analyst’s mind has led to the reactivation
of his own mental processes, will he be ready for more
classical psychoanalytic work. Likewise, only when the
patient finds a clear boundary between external and internal
reality he can withdraw his own projections, regain his
capacity to mourn (Steiner), and, in Fonagy’s terms, be ready
for real intersubjective contact with others.
According to Grinberg, et al., (1993), for Bion, an
interpretation “[...] formulates in simple terms the beliefs
that the patient has about the analyst and the analysis” (p.
118). This idea echoes the emphasis or the use of
interpretations centered on what the patient thinks the analyst
is thinking, proposed by Fonagy for people with mentalization
difficulties. However, when the analyst is faced with a
problem related to the patient’s inability to integrate a mental
representation that has been distorted or barred during his
development, she interprets the conflict brought by this
painful or shameful mental representation. It seems that, from
a Kleinian tradition, Bion’s use of interpretation is more
directed at tackling the contents of unconscious fantasy
expressed in the here-and-now of the transference processes
whereas, in Fonagy’s model, the analyst must wait until the
inhibited mental process have been activated to provide deep
interpretations and deal with unconscious motivations. The
importance of the analyst as a container of what is
incomprehensible for the patient and his involvement in
trying to find meaning and representation for these feelings
is something that both models seem to share.
O’Shaughnessy (1988) notes that Bion’s theory of thinking,
mainly the vicissitudes of the K-link, is a very important tool
for the technique of child psychoanalysis. K is the notation
for “knowing;” this is a basic human kind of object relation
that allows us to know something, it establishes links between
ourselves and other selves, and things in the world (Thorner,
1981), allowing emotional understanding (O’Shaughnessy).
K is formed in the first exchanges between mother and baby,
where projective identification is the way the baby
communicates with its mother, and the way the mother knows
and understands what is going on with her baby. K, therefore,
emerges from an emotional experience. An individual’s limit
to knowing or being known depends on how successful or
unsuccessful these experiences were. Due to innate factors
such as the baby’s envy or the mother’s inadequate nurturing,
the emotions that would otherwise be known and understood
by her remain misunderstood and stripped of their meaning,
and the result is a person who misunderstands himself and
others. In other cases, when the psychotic part of the
personality takes control, the individual is condemned to live
in an unreal universe, surrounded by bizarre objects. Bion
calls the first case Minus K (-K) and the latter No K. In the
emotional quality of the process of knowing and thinking
resides the particularity of Bion’s ideas and the clue to
understanding what is happening in the therapeutic process.
Likewise, in Fonagy’s model, emotions and affects are
cornerstones for developing mentalization (Fonagy, 1989).
The kind of emotional experience undergone in the first
relationships will either promote or inhibit the reflective
function. In pathology, the pain, mistreatment, and sorrow
experienced during infancy will demarcate the limits of what
the patient is subsequently able to think or represent mentally.
Fortunately, via the new emotional experience undergone
with the analyst, this inhibition can be changed to
reactivation of the mental capacities. Moreover, the emotions
themselves will find, in the analytic space, proper recognition
and understanding by the patient (Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
Bion expresses a very interesting idea about the practice
of psychoanalysis. He says that the analyst should be able
to intuit a patient’s emotion before it becomes painfully
obvious to the patient. The aim of this intuitive capacity is
to avoid unnecessary pain for the patient. For Bion, pain is
already part of the process of knowledge that is present in
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any analysis. The constant dialectic movements between
schizoid-paranoid and depressive positions enable the patient
to tolerate psychic pain, which is necessary for development
and change. It could be said that this intuition is somehow
be driven by the analyst’s capacity to unconsciously scan
the mental states perceived in the patient and this, in
Fonagy’s terms, resembles the reflective function. 
Let us return to pain. According to Thorner (1981),
knowing and thinking imply displeasure and pain, and
require a capacity for tolerating frustration. If there is no
capacity to tolerate absence, the capacity to think will never
develop (Bion, 1967a). Joseph (1981) adds that tolerating
pain in the therapeutic process is a prerequisite for feeling
better and for having a true experience of what pleasure is.
Psychoanalytic treatment aims at gaining insights about
oneself and this implies the pain of knowing. Pain is part
of the personality and is present in any acquisition of
knowledge (Grinberg, 1988). This idea of pain as part of
growing is also present in Fonagy’s model in relation to the
activation of mental processes within the setting. The
inhibition of mental processes in the course of development
due to mistreatment or trauma comes from a defense against
pain: the pain of realizing that there were distorted images
of the child and harmful intentions toward him in his
mother’s mind. As mentioned, the psychoanalytic process
within this model implies a space for thinking about what
thinking is, and, for someone who has become afraid of
mental contents, this can be a very painful task. However,
the analyst represents a benign individual to whom the
patient can relate. Also, the analytic relationship constitutes
a safe space in which to help the patient to overcome his
fears about what a mind is, and in time, he will be able to
reactivate his mentalizing stance. Only after this can a more
classic technical approach be applied.
For Bion (1967b), the analyst should allow the analytic
process to unfold freely without interference from his desires
or memories. A desire for cure or results must be left aside,
as well as any deliberate attempt to remember past sessions.
Instead of that, every session should be seen as complete,
not only as a part of the psychoanalytic process but also as
a process in itself. This means that the patient develops not
only over a period of time but within every session.
Therefore, the analyst “[...] should aim at achieving a state
of mind so that, at every session, he feels he has not seen
the patient before” (Bion, 1967b, p. 18). 
Contrariwise, for Fonagy, in the therapeutic process, the
analyst deliberately intends to place the patient in situations
where he is required to think about, for example, what is
in the analyst’s mind. This “more directive” and focused
approach responds to a need to reactivate the mental
processes arrested in the patient, as a prerequisite for more
profound psychoanalytic work with him. Psychoanalytic
work implies a capacity to reflect upon one’s own mental
states; if this capacity is absent, something must be done to
achieve it. Obviously, this is achieved by using
psychoanalytic methods and psychoanalytic understanding;
the result is positive because the range of patients who are
able to be treated psychoanalytically increases. Fonagy’s
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2006) therapeutic model has been
recently turned into a manual for purposes of training and
outcome research.
The introduction of a different technical approach for
people with inhibited mental capacities and the model’s
focus on container-contained to understand the
psychoanalytic relationship seem to be the most important
technical issues in these theories. 
Thinking and Mentalizing: 
A Developmental Sequence?
Can thinking really be considered the seed of
mentalization? Obviously, from a purely epistemological
perspective, there are some impediments to this notion.
Bion’s model still has the remains of an internalistic way
of understanding mental states. However, the process in
which he believes mental states and capacities to be
developed takes place in an intersubjective scenario. As
noted above, his model can be placed in an intermediate
epistemological position between a pure internalistic and a
contemporary intersubjective understanding of the mind.
That means that Bion’s model is relatively close to Fonagy’s,
which is completely based on the Davidsonian idea that
mental states and processes are constructed in a public and
social understanding of the mind. But how can an integrative
epistemological position for both models be found? I believe
that such a position should meet two requirements. On the
one hand, it must prevent subjectivity from being absorbed
by intersubjectivity; that is, it must reserve a space for the
particularities of the subjective experience. On the other
hand, it needs to recognize that subjectivity is constructed
relationally and not privately. In brief: even though the nature
of mental sates is intersubjective, the basis of subjectivity
relies on the body and its instinctual dynamics, which are
also experienced from the beginning in a relational scenario.
Following Bejamin (1995), a creative tension between the
intrapsychic and the intersubjective domains of mental life
should be maintained in order to gain an appropriate
psychoanalytic understanding of mental processes.
The current predominance of relational or so-called “two
person” models of the mind in psychoanalysis (Mitchell,
1988) constitutes an interesting starting point to reorganize
classical meta-psychoanalytic concepts such as drive, desire,
and so on, within an intersubjective framework. This could
also give psychoanalysis the chance to dialogue with
neurosciences, developmental psychology, and cognitive
science. If these ideas about a mind constituted
intersubjectively are taken into account, I think is possible
to say that thinking is the seed of mentalizing and that both
of them are part of the same developmental line.
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